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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
LEO A. BIRD, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
CLOVER LEAF-HARRIS DAIRY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
6333 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Leo A. Bird, the plaintiff and respondent in this case, 
commenced suit on the above entitled action in the City 
Court of Salt Lake City. The action was tried before 
Judge Bryan P. Leverich, sitting without a jury. After a 
judgment for plaintiff as prayed, the appellant appealed 
to the Third Judicial District Court where the same was 
tried de novo before Judge Herbert M. Schiller, sitting 
without a jury. Plaintiff again obtained a judgment as 
prayed. 
The facts as established by the pleadings and evidence 
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are very simple. The appellant by its pleadings admitted 
the following matters: 1. The jurisdictional facts; 2. The 
ownership and occupancy of the buildings known as the 
Clover Leaf-Harris Dairy, located at 723 South State 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah; 3. Plaintiff's son, Montell 
Bird, visited defendant's plant and worked as a milk 
sampler, and that he was an invitee while pursuing such 
activity; 4. That said plaintiff's son parked plaintiff's car, 
on the 6th day of March, 1939, on defendant's premises and 
under a projection attached to the north wall of one of 
defendant's buildings-the building in question; 5. That 
a portion of said north wall fell and collapsed upon the 
said automobile and that by reason thereof, dama.ge was 
sustained by plaintiff, and the damage was stipulated to be 
$633.77. The evidence further reduced the issues to the 
following matters, namely: 1. Whether or not the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur is applicable under the facts alleged 
and proven; and 2. The status occupied by Montell Bird, 
plaintiff's son, while he was on the premises of the defendant 
Dairy. 
Appellant's brief is so replete with misstatements of 
the evidence, and statements purporting to be facts but 
which are not supported by the evidence, all of which may 
influence the court on matters not involved in the case 
that respondent feels constrained to point out a few of these 
incongruities, and in connection therewith respondent in-
corporates herein, to further reflect the misstatements of 
appellant, the findings of fact by the court: 
The caus.e having come on regularly for trial on the 
21st day of March, 1940, Robert S. Spooner appearing as 
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counsel for plaintiff, and Thatcher & Young appearing as 
counsel for defendant; a trial by jury having been waived 
by counsel for the respective parties, the cause was tried 
by the Honorable Herbert M. Schiller who found the fol-
lowing facts : 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the plaintiff is, and at all times hereinafter 
mentioned was, a resident of Salt Lake City and County, 
State of Utah; that the Clover Leaf-Harris Dairy is, and 
at all times hereinafter mentioned was, a corporation or-
ganized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of 
the State of Utah with its principal place of business in 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
2. That on or about the 6th day of March, 1939, the 
plaintiff was the owner of a 1938 Studebaker Sedan auto-
mobile. That on the date aforesaid the defendant owned and 
occupied all the buildings known as the Clover Leaf-Harris 
Dairy and which were and are located at 723 South State 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. That on the date aforesaid, 
and for more than a year prior thereto, plaintiff's son, 
Montell Bird, was regularly employed by the Federated 
Milk Producer's Association, and that on said date was 
working for said Association at the defendant's Dairy with 
the consent, approval and permission of the defendant. 
3. That on or about the 6th day of March, 1939, said 
Montell Bird had borrowed the plaintiff's automobile for 
the purpose of going to work at Defendant's Dairy, and 
that such use and bailment was for the sole benefit of 
Montell Bird and not for the use or benefit of the plaintiff; 
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4 
and that the said Montell Bird on the date aforesaid parked 
the plaintiff's automobile along side the north wall of a 
building owned and occupied by the defendant, and at a 
place where others had parked their automobiles. 
4. That on the date aforesaid, and while plaintiff's 
automobile was parked along side the north wall of defen-
dant's building which was 125 feet long and two stories 
in height, and which was an instrumentality peculiarly, 
exclusively and completely within the control and manage-
ment of the said defendant, and while the plaintiff's auto-
mobile was parked by the aforesaid wall with the consent 
and permission of the defendant, the said wall collapsed 
and fell down and upon plaintiff's car. That the defendant 
knew or should have known of the unsafe and unsound 
condition of said wall and that the damage to plaintiff's 
automobile was proximately caused as a result of the care-
less and negligent maintenance of said wall in an uns.ound 
and unsafe and dangerous condition. That as a direct and 
proximate result of the careless and negligent maintenance 
1 
of an unsafe, unsound and dangerous wall which fell and 
collapsed upon plaintiff's automobile, plaintiff suffered 
damages. to his said automobile in the sum of $633.77. 
On page 2, appellant's statements, that, "The space 
between the garage and shop is reserved exclusively for 
company trucks entering and leaving the garage and for 
making necessary repairs," and, "This was reserved for 
entrance to the garage," are apparently designed to influ-
ence the court to believe that every one who came on the 
premises was immediately aware of this "exclusive" reser-
vation of space for company trucks either by signs posted 
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or by oral or written notice actually given. This is not 
supported by the evidence in any particular. There is no 
evidence that Montell Bird had notice, actual or construc-
tive, of this "exclusive" parking area. Again, on page 3, 
appellant states, "Certain employees sometimes left their 
cars under the east canopy. However, it was in violation 
of positive rules announced both orally and by written notice 
posted on walls, and also printed bills which were at times 
placed in offending cars." It is true employees did park 
their cars in this "exclusive" area, and appellant's evidence 
is that notices were posted, not in this area, but on an 
employee's bulletin board, but there is no evidence that 
printed bills were ever placed in offending cars. 
At the first trial there was no mention of a Mr. Meyers, 
a company representative, assisting in the routine inspec-
tion three months prior to the collapse of the wall. It was 
never claimed that Mr. Meyers is a building expert or came 
for the purpose of an inspection. However, it seems to us 
that had Mr. Meyers been present this fact would have been 
established at the first trial. 
On pages 4, 9 and 11, appellant refers to the plaintiff's 
son as Leo Montell Bird. Leo A. Bird is the plaintiff and 
Leo Montell Bird is his son, and it was Montell Bird who 
worked at defendant's premises and parked the plaintiff's 
car. No evidence was offered to show agency, actual or 
implied, but on the contrary plaintiff established that 
Montell Bird borrowed the car for his own use and not 
for the use or benefit of Leo A. Bird, the plaintiff. 
There is no evidence that "no company officiaJ or em-
.ployee saw Montell drive plaintiff's car there (by the wall 
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in question)." There is: some evidence, however, that Mr. 
Gallagher and Mr. Johnson were not aware of the presence 
of the car. 
ARGUMENT 
Appellant devotes the major portion of its brief ad-
mitting Montell Bird was an invitee on its premises until 
he parked a Studebaker automobile by the north wall of a 
particular building and at that moment he became a tres-
passer or licensee, consequently eliminating the possibility 
of liability unless the company committed wilful or wanton 
acts of destruction upon the car. 
Appellant admits that Mantell Bird had the right to 
enter its premises. and work in its plant. He had an express 
invitation to enter for a purpose connected with the business 
in which the Dairy was engaged. The appellant further 
concedes that he could park a car in the rear of the plant 
and leaving this area walk past the building in question to 
reach his destination without losing his personality as an 
invitee. Further narrowing appellant's own position, it is 
apparent in all parts of the brief and the transcript that 
appellant had no objection to Mr. Bird riding his bicycle 
onto the premises and placing it inside the garage directly 
ahead of where the car was parked. The evidence shows 
that he sometimes rode a bicycle to work and when he did 
he placed it there. The evidence for plaintiff tends to show 
that Mantell drove a Chevrolet Coupe which he bought after 
the accident, this was in April, 1939. So when appellant 
says Mantell drove a F'ord Coupe, he means. a Chevrolet 
Coupe. Mr. Johnson, a witness for appellant, testified he 
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had seen Montell in a Chevrolet Coupe in the vicinity of 
this garage and that he had not admonished him on his 
parking habits. Mantell Bird did testify that he had parked 
plaintiff's car at various places. Sometimes it was parked 
in the lot, sometimes along the south part of the driveway 
and the west side of the garage in question where cars 
were permitted to be parked by appellant's evidence, and 
sometimes where it was parked on the day in question. 
Now appellant's counsel says that respondent's position is 
absurd, but consider the palpable inconsistencies and un-
reasonableness of their argument. They say, if Montell Bird 
had walked to work, entered appellant's premises and 
walked back by the garage, which is about fifteen feet 
from where he engaged in his activities, and the wall fell 
on him, he would have been an invitee; if he rode his 
bicycle to work and placed it inside the garage immediately 
ahead of the space where the Studebaker was parked, and 
was in the act of leaving the garage when the wall fell on 
him, he would have been an invitee, as Johnson, a witness 
for appellant, on page 43 of Transcript of testimony testified 
this was not objectionable; again, if he parked in the rear 
parking area and was passing the garage on his way to work 
(which he would necessarily have to do) when the wall 
. fell on him, he would have been an invitee; and to go fur-
ther, if he parked along the south side of the driveway 
or the west part of the garage wall, walked around to the 
north section of the same building, and the wall fell on 
him, he still would have been an invitee, for Johnson again 
testified, Transcript of testimony p. 42, that this parking was 
not objectionable, but when Mr. Bird parked plaintiff's car 
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where he had parked before on several occasions, and where 
employee's cars were parked at the time, he became a tres-
passer! Whatever mental legerdemain appellant's counsel 
employed to arrive at this startling conclusion I fail to 
apprehend, it certainly was not taken from legal authority. 
In Plummer v. Dill, 156 Mass. 426, 31 N. E. 128, the 
court holds, among other things : 
To be an invitee the visitor must come onto the 
premises for a purpose connected with the business 
in which the occupant is engaged or which he per-
mits to be carried on. There must be some mutuality 
of interest in the subject to which the visitor's bus-
iness relates, although the particular thing which is 
the object of the visit may not be for the benefit of 
the occupant. 
The above rule covers the situation which existed in 
the case at bar. Plaintiff's son was employed by the Feder-
ated Milk Producer's Association and was assigned to ap-
pellant's Dairy to. carry on his duties. He worked in such 
capacity for the better part of a year and one half in an 
important section of the Dairy. Every can of milk was 
sampled by him for its milk and cream content. Appellant 
was benefitted in that it was required to pay only such 
sums as· the samples indicated they were worth in accord-
ance with a set scale; also, precise contents of each con-
tainer as to the proportions of cream and milk were ascer-
tained, and many other benefits· not necessary to here 
enumerate as appellant concedes the work was connected 
with the business. Also, the uncontradicted evidence is 
that Montell Bird usually had to take the samples with him 
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(Tr. 28) and this would necessitate some sort of conveyance 
to and from work. 
The court will observe that in discussing appellant's 
position I have insisted that Montell Bird was. either an 
invitee or a trespasser. This contention is based upon ap-
pellant's own evidence and admission. F'or the cases show 
that it is a non sequitur to say there is no knowledge or 
permission of certain conduct and then say that such con-
duct made the actor a licensee, to be a licensee there must 
be some knowledge or consent on the owner's part to the 
conduct in question. He was then either an invitee or a 
trespasser, and from all the admissions, evidence and. find-
ings it certainly could not be determined that he was a 
trespasser. 
The Plummer case is approved in Kinsman v. Bar'ton & 
Co., 141 Wash. 311, 251 Pac. 563, which held a.mong other 
things: 
An invitee is one who either expressly or im-
pliedly is invited onto the premises of another in con-
nection with the business carried on ; a licensee is 
not a trespasser because he has permission to enter 
for other purposes not connected with the business. 
The appellant also cites Kinsman v. Barton as an authority 
for its position, but upon a superficial reading of the case 
it will be observed that the facts distinguish it from the 
one at bar, although the general rule is adopted. In the 
Kinsman case plaintiff conducted. a lunch stand business 
on defendant's premises which was not in any way con-
nected with its business and was not required to pay rent 
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therefore. Plaintiff stepped in a hole, causing the injury 
complained of, which was as apparent to her as it was to 
the defendant. This situation, of course, is widely different 
from the one at bar. 
It has often been held that the duty of keeping premises 
in repair and in a safe condition extends to means, of ingress 
and egress which, although not the proper ways, the owner 
of premises permits customers and others to use them with-
out taking precaution to prevent such use. 
Landy vs. Olson and Suley Sash & Door Co., 171 
Minn. 440, 214 N. W. 659 
Campbell vs. Sutliff, 193 Wis. 370, 214 N. W. 374 
Certainly the par king of cars would come under the same rule 
as does walking in and out of premises. All the cases cited 
by appellant are based upon facts which show that the 
injury or damage caused came as a result of some affirma-
tive act on the plaintiff's part which in turn caused. the 
neglect attributed to the defendant to result in such injury 
or damage. There could be no suggestion in the case at bar 
that the act of parking a car had anything to do with the 
collapse of the wall, as the wall would have collapsed any-
way. The simple truth, as shown by the evidence and. the 
tenor of appellant's brief, is, that no one cared who parked 
by this garage when the trucks were out until it appeared 
that plaintiff wanted reimbursement for the damage done 
his car. If the parking situation was as serious as the com-
pany officials would now have the court believe certainly 
8ix employees would not have had their cars parked by this 
garage. Until Mr. Bird was informed not to use this area 
what reason would he have not to park there? 
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The brief written by appellant at the request of Judge 
Schiller contained this statement, and which is again stated 
on page 6 of its present brief: "Even though they (the com-
pany officials) saw the car standing there, which is denied, 
yet they migh have supposed it to belong to some visiting 
guest of the company officials who perchance was invited 
to place his car under the canopy." Now, no one needed 
to "box the boy's ears" to prevent his parking in this place, 
even though Mr. Young would have the court think so. If 
any one had informed him that notwithstanding employees 
parked by this wall, and notwithstanding other invitees 
parked there, that he was forbidden this. privilege no doubt 
he would have ceased-but what reason would Montell Bird 
have, or any other person similarly situated have, not to 
park as he did, especially when he needed a conveyance to 
carry samples? 
The principle announced in Gavin vs. O'Connor, cited 
by appellant is correct, but the facts distinguish it con-
siderable from the facts in the case at bar. I cannot con-
ceive of a way to reconcile the two cases for the facts of 
cases give rise to the many principles of law. Appellant 
cites, 45 C. J. at page 816 and quotes therefrom, but it 
will be observed that the section does not contemplate a 
situation where the person on the premises is already an 
invitee by express invitation, it contemplates a situation 
where plaintiff is. attempting to establish his status without 
a showing of express invitation. 
An invitee does not lose his status as such because of 
a slight deviation from the usual course of travel or passage, 
Ellington v. Rich, 102 S. E. 510, which held a deviation of 
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twenty-five feet not to alter the status although it was not 
necessary to go in that place. 
Also see, Southeastern Portland Cement Co. v. 
Bustellas, 216 S. W. 268. 
In addition to the statement of appellant's counsel 
relative to the case of Loney vs. Laramie Auto Com-
pany, the court said, "Nor would it seem unreasonable to 
hold that the owner of premises should anticipate what is 
usually and customarily done by an invitee within the scope 
of, and to carry out the purpose of, the invitation." Also in 
Heckman v. Sisters of Charity, cited by appellant, the 
court allowed recovery primarily on the proposition that 
if there is a deviation from the invitation there must be 
shown to have been some notice given. by the defendant to 
apprise the plaintiff of its wishes. 
It is notable that the majority of the cases deal with 
defects in premises which are, or should be, as obvious to 
the invitee or the licensee as there are, or should be, to the 
owner of the premises. In the case at bar there is. no 
doubt that the defect which existed could not have been 
discovered by Montell Bird without inspection of the wall. 
At page 82 of the transcript of testimony, Mr. Gallagher, 
manager of the Dairy, testified the inspection was a rou-
tine quarterly inspection. Witnesses for appellant testified 
that they had no knowledge of a defect in the structure of 
the garage. Well, certainly, had they testified otherwise 
there would be no defense at all. The point is, should they 
have had some knowledge of such a defect. 
The owner of premises is under a positive duty not 
only to exercise reasonable care to provide safe premises 
but also is under a duty to discover the use or uses invitees 
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are putting their premises to and use reasonable care to pro-
tect them in that extended use. Some of the cases cited 
below deal with both points and others deal with only the 
first mentioned. 
H'interoud vs. Christensen, 68 Utah 546, 251 
Pac. 360 
Blanchette vs. Union Street Railway Co., 248 
Mass. 407, 143 N. E. 310 
Elie vs. Lewiston Railway Co., 112 Me. 178, 91 
Atl. 786 
Holmes vs. Drew, 151 Mass. 587, 25 N. E. 22 
Hupfer vs. National Distilling Co., 114 Wis. 279, 
90 N. W. 191 
Pauchner vs. Wahem, 211 Ill. 276, 83 N. E. 202 
Dobbie vs. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 95 Cal. 
App. 781, 273 Pac. 630 
Appellant's attorney's have set forth several cases deal-
ing with licensees and trespassers, but from the admissions 
made, the pleadings, the evidence, the findings, and even 
the cases and argument of appellant's brief, there can be no 
doubt that Mantell Bird was at all times an invitee. We 
contend there never was a deviation for there never was 
notice given. Further, that if notice had been given so as 
to make a deviation, the deviation was not of such nature 
as to cause Mantell Bird to lose his status., but notice, actual 
or constructive, was never alleged nor proven. 
We now come to the question of whether the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur is applicable in this. case. In connection 
with consideration of the doctrine many of the cases. herein-
after cited supplement the question raised as to Mr. Bird's 
status while he was on appellant's property for the two 
propositions here raised go hand in hand in most cas.es as 
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stated in appellant's brief. I call the Court's attention to 
the well known and famous case of Byrne v. Bowlle, 2 H 
& C. 722 Exchequer ( 1863) . In this case the plaintiff re-
ceived injury when she was. struck upon the head by a 
barrel which fell out of defendant's building. Plaintiff 
offered no proof of negligence other than this. The court 
held that the evidence showing the barrel to have hit plain-
tiff and that it emanated from defandant's building was 
sufficient to cast the burden of proving that the barrel 
fell without negligence by the defendant. To the same effect 
under similar circumstances is Inland and Seaboard Coasting 
Co. v. Tolson, 139 U. 8. 551. 
A leading Utah case, Angerman v. Edgemon, 76 Ut. 
394, 290 Pac. 169, and exhaustively treated at 79 A. L. R. 
40, lays. down the law in Utah on these facts: 
Plaintiff conducted a millinery shop on the 
ground floor of a building leased by defendants who 
conducted a hotel business on the 2nd and 3rd floors. 
On the day in question a considerable flow of water 
escaped from the toilet fixtures on the 3rd floor and 
in due time seeped through to plaintiff's shop damag-
ing some dresses. Plaintiff alleged general negli-
gence and also made specific allegations of negli-
gence. 
The defendant's evidence showed that the most 
modern plumbing equipment had been installed 
throughout, and that, only a few days prior they had 
employed skilled workmen to inspect the plumbing, 
and that no defects were found, and that they did not 
know what caused the water to over-flow. The plain-
tiff relied on the doctrine as no specific acts were 
shown. 
On appeal from a judgment for plaintiff, the 
Supreme Court held that the doctrine of res ipsa lo-
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quitur applied as the plaintiff had no means of as-
certaining wherein the defendants were negligent, 
and notwithstanding no specific acts of negligence 
were shown as alleged, and notwithstanding the evi-
dence produced by defendants. The Court going on 
the principle that such a thing does not occur in the 
ordinary course of events unless there is some negli-
gence on defendant's part in some particular. 
At this point the Court's attention might be drawn to 
several cases cited by appellant for the purpose of attempt-
ing to apprise the court of the limitations on the doctrine. 
In Denver vs. Spencer, plaintiff alleged specific acts of 
negligence and also attempted to rely on the doctrine. In 
some jurisdictions the rule has been laid down that one can-
not aHege specific acts of negligence and failing therein, 
either to prove the same or offer proof, fall back on the doc-
trine for support. The matter is treated at 79 A. L. R. 40, 
as above stated, and it will be seen that in Utah the plaintiff 
would have recovered. Kennedy vs. Hawkins goes off on 
about the same grounds and for the same reasons as the 
above Colnrado case as this jurisdiction has the same rule. 
However, a close consideration of the facts show that the 
defendant did not have exclusive control of the things which 
gave rise to the injury, and also, that other persons were in-
strumental in altering the conditions. In Zoccolillo vs. 0. S. 
L. the court refused to apply the doctrine yet it would seem 
that this case is somewhat out of line with the Utah cases de-
cided both before and after. However, the court was par-
ticularly attracted to the proposition that neither plaintiff 
nor her family registered co-mplaint with the defendant's 
servants relative to the temperature of the train, and that 
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had such complaint been made perhaps the plaintiff's injury 
would have been avoided or greatly minimized. The Court 
did however, lay down this rule, notwithstanding, "When a 
thing which causes injury, without the fault of the injured 
person, is shown to be under the exclusive control of the de-
fendant, and the injury is such as in the ordinary course of 
things does not occur if the one having such control uses 
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence that t~?-e injury 
arose from defendant's want of care." 
In another Utah case, Dearden vs. San Pedro, 33 Utah 
147, 93 Pac. 271, the Utah court applied the doctrine to a 
case where a brake chain had been broken and plaintiff sus-
tained injury when a flying switch was attempted by the 
engine and water car and as a result of the broken brake 
chain the cars collided with a passenger car carrying plain-
tiff. Also see, 
Uggla vs. Brokaw, 102 N.Y. Supp. 857 
It is not necessary to give proof of the owner's knowl-
edge of the unsafe condition of the building, 
Gray vs. Boston Gaslight Co., 114 Mass. 149, 19 
Am. Rep. 324 
Butts vs. National Exchange Bank, 72 S. W. 
1083 
Waterhouse vs. J os. Schlitz Brewing Co., S. Dak. 
94 N. W. 587 
this would necessarily have to be the rule or the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur would be a theory without possibility of 
application. 
The case of J. C. Penny Co. vs. Forrest, 183 Okl. 106, 
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180 Pac. 2nd 640, is in line with the Angerman case and 
very much like the one at bar. The facts were briefly these: 
Plaintiff received injury while in the defen-
dant's store when a merchandise carrier fell from 
the overhead system used for carrage in the store. 
Examination disclosed an iron casting holding a bolt 
on the appliance broke which permitted the mechan-
ism to fall upon plaintiff. 
The defendant showed the system was approved 
in over a thousand stores, and that an inspection 
made just a week prior had disclosed no defects. 
Plaintiff relied upon the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur although specific acts of negligence were 
alleged. 
The court applied the doctrine precisely as does 
the Utah court, and further held the sufficiency of 
the evidence to be a matter for the jury or the court 
sitting without a jury to determine-as does the An-
german case. 
In the absence of satisfactory explanation that the 
falling of a building, a wall or a part thereof, was accidental, 
and no showing is made as to unusual happenings or events 
which caused the same to fall, the land owner is liable, Sin-
hovitz vs. Peters Land Co., 64 S. E. 93. The court said on 
page 95, paragraph 2, "The evidence showed that a pane 
of glass, without apparent cause, fell from the window of 
defendant's building injuring plaintiff. The plaintiff had 
the right to be where she was, and the duty was upon de-
fendant to use ordinary and reasonable care in the construc-
tion and maintenance of the building so as not to occasion 
injury-Barring human intervention-panes of glass do 
not fall from windows unless the glass is either not placed 
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properly in the sash at the start or unless by reason of lapse 
of time the sash and glass stand in need of repair." 
Appellant cites Nucek vs. Weaver which at first blush 
appears to be contrary to our position, but on perusal seems 
to confirm it. Without here recording the defendant's de-
fense, I call the Court's attention thereto as compared with 
the defense offered by the Dairy in the case at bar. In every 
case the Court will read in connection herewith it cannot 
help but be impressed by the inadequacy of the defendant's 
evidence in the present case compared with those cited-and 
in the cited cases the evidence was insufficient and inade-
quate. I think it reasonable to assume an indisposition on 
the part of defendant not to offer so complete a defense but 
rather to trust in some sort of divine providence to furnish 
one. For if an investigation were made to determine the 
cause of the collapse of this wall the findings were not of-
fered in evidence, and if an investigation was not made then 
we submit there must be some reason therefor which is 
known only by the officials of the company. No act of God 
was ever suggested as being the proximate cause of this ac-
cident. Normally the collapse of any structure upon one's 
land would stir at least a mild interest as to the cause there-
of in the landowner's mind--especially when about $4000.00 
worth of damage was done to cars belonging to employees 
and invitees. The Court will observe that in all cases cited 
an investigation was made and the findings put in evidence 
as a defense even though it was not always found to elimin-
ate liability. 
The case of N ucek vs. W·ea ver and Pickwick Corp. vs. 
Messinger, both cited by appellant, and several cases cited 
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by respondent hold that the sufficiency of the evidence in 
explanation of the accident is for the jury, or the court sit-
ting without a jury, to decide. The ruling in the Pickwick 
case shows that the issue on appeal turned on a matter of 
improper instruction given by the trial judge which pre-
cluded the defendant from offering evidence which might 
have explained the cause of the accident. 
Mr. Justice Larson will undoubtedly be surprised at the 
construction placed on part of his opinion in White vs. 
Pinney, which is cited by the appellant, and which is set 
out in quotation therefrom on page 17 of appellant's brief. 
Most cases hold that a presumption arises from the applica-
tion of the doctrine, but the Utah court has for some time 
held it to be an inference which makes the doctrine effective 
as an evidentiary matter. How does this alter the applica-
tion of the doctrine? One line of decisions holds it to be a 
rebuttable presumption, while another liAe of decisions, as 
explained by Justice Larson in the Utah case, holds the 
burden of going forward with the evidence shifts to the de-
fendant to show that he was not guilty of negligence. Per-
haps the quantum of proof is greater under one view than 
under the other, but this is the extent of divergence. The 
rule announced by Justice Larson is certainly more equitable 
and less onerous for it allows the defendant to produce evi-
dence which would explain the accident, its cause, and show 
the amount of care he exercised in apprehension of just such 
damage. But the mere statement of this rule does not con-
stitute evidence sufficient to meet the evidentiary inference, 
there must be affirmative proof which will satisfy a jury, 
or a trial judge sitting without a jury, that he has exercised 
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all the care prudent men would have exercised under the 
circumstances and that he has exercised all care commensur-
ate with the damages to be apprehended. Appellant failed 
utterly to offer in evidence any e~planation from which a 
judge or jury could determine whether or not he had met 
the requirements set up by Justice Larson. 
The law is well settled in Utah, as in other states, that 
the sufficiency of the evidence in explanation of the acci-
dent is for the jury, as the court sitting without a jury, to 
determine considering all the evidence introduced. 
Angerman vs. Edgemon, 76 Utah 394, 290 Pac. 
169 
Nucek vs. Weaver, 54 Pac. 2nd 768 
J. C. Penney Co. vs. Forrest, 183 Okl. 106, 180 
Pac. 2nd 640 
There are several well considered decisions all of which 
hold that buildings properly constructed and properly main-
tained do not fall from slight causes but only from adequate 
or substantial causes, and that when a building, or a wall 
thereof, does fall without apparent cause, in the absence of 
explanatory circumstances, negligence will be presumed. 
336 
Mullen vs. St. John, 57 N.Y. 567 
Patterson vs. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 91 N. W. 
Jill vs. Middleton, 105 Mass. 477 
W orthin vs. Goodall, 138 Mass. 533 
Readman vs. Conway, 126 Mass. 374 
City of Denver vs. Soloman, 31 Pac. 507 
Looney vs. McLean, 129 Mass. 295 
Volmar vs. Manhattan Ry. Co., 134 N. Y. 418. 
There are cases of liability when buildings fall onto 
other property, and which charge the landowners, with a 
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positive duty to keep their premises in safe condition and 
repair and to guard against structural defects which the 
use of ordinary care will reflect. 
Scha.riff vs. Southern Illinois Cowt. Co., 92 S. W. 
126 
Hudgins vs. Ham, 240 F'ed. 387-5th Circuit, 24 
Minn. 501, 
Respondent has never claimed, nor does he now claim, that 
property owners are insurers of the safety of others and 
their property which are rightfully on the premises, but 
we certainly claim the protection which reasonable care 
would insure and which all the decisions hold we have a 
right to claim. 
On page 4 of its brief appellant states that as many as 
four men would get on the canopy attached to the wall and 
shovel off the accumulated snow without causing indica-
tions of weakness or excessive strain. If any strain were 
shown at any time from such practice the company was 
put on notice that accidents might occur, and precaution 
should have been taken for the safety of those who might 
come in contact with this wall. Obviously, this was not 
done. 
The rule in Dugal vs. Peoples Bank, 34 N. E. 581, holds 
that an owner of a building would be liable for negligently 
allowing snow and ice to accumulate on the roof or pro-
jection and, although he may and can build any way he 
pleases in accordance with municipal ordinance, and the 
style adopted is not negligence per se, nevertheless, it im~ 
poses a greater degree of care and watchfulness to prevent 
accidents as a result of such construction. The testimony 
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of the plant foreman is that this canopy was put up two 
years after the construction of the· building, and there is 
no evidence that the building was constructed to accommo-
date the strain it would necessarily exert. 
From a full consideration of all the cases it is evident 
that appellant sums up all its evidence and defense in one 
short paragraph as stated concisely on page 4 of its brief, 
which says, "None of the officers or employees of the com-
pany knew anything in or about the building, or the canopy 
(although this is questionable from the statement made as 
to excessive strain in the paragraph just below), suggest-
ing inherent weakness or need or repair or replacements." 
Appellant's attorneys either do not wish to understand the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and the cases they have read 
in connection therewith or they refuse to recognize that 
these many cases make sense. On page 20 of appellant's 
brief its attorneys argue a set of facts entirely foreign to 
this case. They even become so irritated in their distaste 
for the doctrine as applied to their tautological set of facts 
that they irefully condemn the rule announced by Justice 
Larson which they had reveled in but a few pages before. 
As has been said in ~any of the cases, walls or build-
ings in the ordinary course of events do not collapse or fall 
down. There is some reason such as fire, earthquake, im-
proper construction or improper maintenance or the like. 
It might well be said that a building once constructed some 
day will fall down. This, however, presupposes failure of 
owners to make necessary repairs. The appellant offers 
not one scintilla of evidence that repairs had ever had been 
made in twenty years, or that the building was properly 
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canopy was properly and sufficiently constructed for safety, 
nor that the north wall of the garage was held up by any 
more than the east and west end walls and the roof, nor 
what the cause of the accident might have been. A wall125 
feet long and two stories high does not just collapse with-
out exhibiting considerable indication of its weakness or 
defective condition long before such collapse occurs. 
The appellant has admitted by pleadings, by the evi-
dence, and by its brief that Montell Bird was an invitee 
while working on its premises, and we contend, and the 
court so found, that there was never a deviation, slight or 
otherwise. How can they now complain because the court 
found their admissions to be true? No question of contrib-
utory negligence has been raised. No claim is made that 
Montell Bird had any notice or knowledge that parking by 
this wall was prohibited. Employees and other vis,itors 
regularly parked in this space, and the evidence shows that 
this space was not used by company trucks from early morn-
ing until after one p. m. All defendant's evidence relative 
to parking is frivolous and cannot command respect. 
We submit that the complaint did state a cause of ac-
tion; that the plaintiff's evidence was sufficient and the 
defendant's evidence insufficient under all the cases, and 
that the court made proper finding of fact and correctly 
applied the law thereto; and that judgment should be af-
firmed with costs to respondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT S. SPOONER, 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
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